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Abstract. The ICMP protocol has been widely used and accepted as a
covert channel. While the ICMP protocol is very simple to use, modern
security approaches such as firewalls, deep-packet inspection and intru-
sion detection systems threaten the use of ICMP for a reliable means for
a covert channel. This study explores the modern usefulness of ICMP
with typical security measures in place. Existing ICMP covert channel
solutions are examined for compliance with standard RFCs and resiliency
with modern security approaches.
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1 Introduction
The Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) [1] is designed to provide feed-
back about problems in the communication environment. ICMP relies on the
basic support of IP as part of a higher level protocol. Due to this dependency,
both ICMPv4 and ICMPv6 exist for both versions of IP. Many message codes
exist within ICMP to properly diagnose network problems and traffic flow. ICMP
messages are sent under many different circumstances such as an unreachable
destination or general congestion control on the network. Simple network trou-
bleshooting utilities such as ping and traceroute utilize explicit ICMP messages
to gather information about a network.
Covert channels often refer to a hidden information stream and more specif-
ically, hidden streams embedded in IEEE 802 networks. Lampson [2] originally
defined covert channels under a number of categories such as storage, timing,
termination, resource exhaustion and power. Most covert channels involving the
use of ICMP are largely storage channels where unused fields are utilized for
covert communication. ICMP as a covert channel provides many benefits due
to the overall simplicity. Only several fields exist within most ICMP messages,
which enable quick implementations and simple channel setup/teardown. The
idea of using ICMP as a covert channel is to use a lesser standard communication
protocol rather than TCP or UDP. This will have a smaller footprint across the
network and may go unnoticed by network administrators and traffic analyz-
ers. What really makes the ICMP protocol a viable covert channel is the use of
data fields or payloads within certain messages. By generating packets based on
specific message codes and embedding the actual covert channel message in the
data field enables ICMP to serve as an alternate use for covert channels. These
simple factors enable ICMP to be considered as stealth traffic.
2 Current Countermeasures
Countermeasures exist within the ICMP covert channel realm, however they
come at a cost. As with all aspects of security, tradeoffs exist.
Blocking all ICMP traffic from entering the network prevents all aspects of
ICMP communication, including covert channels. This methodology may not be
acceptable due to the loss of network troubleshooting abilities. Also, blocking
ICMP communications at a central firewall may not solve the problem due to
the ability to send ICMP messages from an internal network to other internal
hosts.
Block specific ICMP messages from entering the network. This methodology
also incorporates the use of segmenting incoming and outgoing connections. If
this countermeasure is enacted, both parties involved in the covert channel can
develop fuzzing techniques to modify the ICMP messages used for communica-
tion or which party initiates the channel depending on the traffic restrictions.
Restricting the size of ICMP packets. By blocking large ICMP packets, an
ICMP message with an extensive data field will be dropped and perceived as a
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crafted packet with a malicious or unknown payload. Large ICMP packets can
be used to test a network for proper handling of large packets. An adversary
can also overcome this limitation by fragmenting their ICMP covert channel to
smaller packets.
Traffic normalization. Traffic normalization techniques such as state preser-
vation will reply and generate new packets on the senders behalf. The normalizer,
typically a firewall, will serve as a proxy, rebuild messages and construct new pay-
loads. This activity essentially disrupts ICMP covert channel communication by
stripping out the message payload. State preservation requires significant com-
putational power and may not scale to particular environments with high traffic
loads.
3 Related Work
Research in this area focuses on existing solutions currently available for ICMP
covert channel communication. Loki, an ICMP tunneling back door application,
tunnels remote shell commands in ICMP echo reply / requests and DNS query
/ reply traffic. This proof of concept was originally published in Phrack World
News [3] to demonstrate the vulnerabilities within these protocols. This imple-
mentation is very easy to deploy and thusly carries a risk security risk of ICMP
tunneling.
Another implementation named Ping Tunnel [4], is focused on reliably tun-
neling TCP connections using ICMP echo request and reply packets. This tool
can be with an outside proxy to tunnel traffic using ICMP messages back to
the requesting client. The exterior proxy serves all TCP requests and forwards
the data back to the client via ICMP echo reply. Although this solution can
be viewed as subverting typical network communication, it is also important to
realize other potential uses for ICMP covert communication.
ICMP-Chat [6] implements a basic console-based chat mechanism that uti-
lizes ICMP packets for communication. A unique aspect of this solution incor-
porates the use of an encrypted data field using AES-256. By implementing an
encrypted payload this further secures the covert channel, but adds increased
suspicions on an abnormal ICMP payload.
With the increasing awareness of IPv6, covert channel tools further expanded
into the realm of ICMPv6. A tool v00d00N3t [7] was developed to operate specif-
ically over IPv6. This tool focuses on the infancy of IPv6 protection technology.
Dual IPv4/IPv6 routers are utilized to route IPv6 traffic to send messages and
files using ICMPv6. Useful information is embedded into fields other than the
data field. The ICMPv6 ID is used to identify how many bytes out of the payload
to read. The ICMPv6 sequence number tells the receiver if it should read the
packet.
Additional defensive research has been performed to further limit the capa-
bilities of ICMP covert channels. A Linux kernel module was developed to scan
ICMP messages for specific signatures such as passwd, root, etc, ls and dir [5].
If these signatures were detected, the ICMP message was essentially scrubbed
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by zeroing out the data field while being processed by the network stack. This
technique is similar to normalizing traffic, however the action of data scrub-
bing is performed on the end nodes. This solution can also be deemed as a very
computational intensive process involving bi-directional deep-packet inspection.
The added network processing overhead may not be acceptable for performance
reasons.
With these current solutions outlined, little information is available for actual
survivability of the tools and general ICMP covert channel message resiliency
with common security appliances. The use of intrusion detection, intrusion pre-
vention and firewalls are commonplace within a production environment. To
fully understand the capabilities of ICMP as a covert channel, it must contain a
moderate amount of resiliency in modern networks.
4 Existing Solutions
ICMP-Chat [6] is based on a simple console-based chat interface which uses
ICMP packets for communication. Features of this solution include the use of
AES-256 encryption for encrypting chat data across the channel. ICMP-Chat
provides several protection mechanisms such as password protecting the chan-
nel using SHA-256 and supporting the ability to change usage of ICMP codes
within the application. This allows for mobility between ICMP codes to further
obfuscate the channel.
Ping Tunnel [4] allows a user to tunnel TCP connections to a remote host
using ICMP echo request and reply packets. This is achieved through the use
of a proxy serving as the remote host. This solution can be utilized as a covert
channel when the operating network is heavily restricted.
Each of these solutions will be tested and further explored in the following
sections in terms of resiliency with modern security devices such as firewalls and
intrusion detection systems.
5 Experiment
A minimalistic test environment was created using VMware Workstation. Two
CentOS workstations are used as the endpoints of the covert channel. A Check-
point NGX R65 firewall separates the network between internal and external
clients. The internal network simulates a small business with a firewall and IDS
in place. The external network simulates an Internet node communicating to the
business. ICMP communication is permitted to the interior node, all remaining
traffic is dropped at the firewall.
The Checkpoint firewall serves as a network layer inspection engine to de-
tect fields and patterns in the network layer. This firewall provides sufficient
inspection for a network layer covert channel.
A Snort IDS [8] is deployed inline on the network listening in promiscuous
mode. All traffic passing through the internal network is captured and analyzed
ICMP Covert Channel Resiliency 5
by the IDS. The standard Snort ruleset was updated to the latest version from
Sourcefire.
The basis for this experiment focuses on the resiliency of ICMP as a viable
covert channel. ICMP-Chat and Ping Tunnel will be used in this environment to
test resiliency against a modern firewall and IDS. Resiliency will be examined for
each tool on connection establishment, connection integrity and overall covert
design.
6 Results
Given the provided experiment, both ICMP-Chat and Ping Tunnel are examined
for ICMP resiliency. Each tool was installed and tested for functionality on both
internal and external workstations.
6.1 ICMP-Chat
By default, ICMP-Chat uses echo reply packets for primary communication.
Figure 1 illustrates the network topology of the experiment. When comparing
standard operating system echo reply packets to echo reply packets generated by
the ICMP-Chat application many parameters follow standard RFC compliance.
Fig. 1. ICMP-Chat covert channel environment
The standard CentOS echo reply, shown in Figure 2 consists of several key
focus areas such as packet size and data content. A total of 98 bytes are captured
on the wire with a 56 byte data field. The data field also standardizes on the
following sequence of characters: !#$%&’()*+,-./01234567. For a perfect covert
channel, the ICMP communication should match this similar format to reduce
detection.
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Frame Frame 2397 (98 bytes on wire, 98 bytes captured)
Ethernet II, Src: Vmware_3a:02:dd (00:50:56:3a:02:dd), Dst:
Vmware_3a:07:f8 (00:50:56:3a:07:f8)
Internet Protocol, Src: 10.1.1.2 (10.1.1.2), Dst: 192.168.202.153
(192.168.202.153)
Internet Control Message Protocol




Sequence number: 1 (0x0001)
Data (56 bytes)
Data: CB9E0B4AEC62080008090A0B0C0D0E0F1011121314151617
0000 00 50 56 3a 07 f8 00 50 56 3a 02 dd 08 00 45 00 .PV:PV:.E.
0010 00 54 84 94 00 00 40 01 5f d0 0a 01 01 02 c0 a8 .T.@._.......
0020 ca 99 00 00 25 68 24 48 00 01 cb 9e 0b 4a ec 62 .%h$H..J.b
0030 08 00 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f 10 11 12 13 14 15 .............
0040 16 17 18 19 1a 1b 1c 1d 1e 1f 20 21 22 23 24 25 ....... !#$%
0050 26 27 28 29 2a 2b 2c 2d 2e 2f 30 31 32 33 34 35 &()*+,-./012345
0060 36 37 67
Fig. 2. Standard CentOS echo reply
An ICMP-Chat echo reply session was initiated, sent with the message test
and the capture is illustrated in Figure 3.
Frame 491 (318 bytes on wire, 318 bytes captured)
Ethernet II, Src: Vmware_3a:02:db (00:50:56:3a:02:db), Dst:
Vmware_3a:07:f7 (00:50:56:3a:07:f7)
Internet Protocol, Src: 192.168.202.153 (192.168.202.153), Dst: 10.1.1.2
(10.1.1.2)
Internet Control Message Protocol




Sequence number: 1280 (0x0500)
Data (276 bytes)
Data: 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000449569F8...
0000 00 50 56 3a 07 f7 00 50 56 3a 02 db 08 00 45 00 .PV:...PV:....E.
0010 01 30 eb f9 00 00 40 01 f7 8e c0 a8 ca 99 0a 01 .0....@.........
0020 01 02 00 00 88 57 00 00 05 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 .....W..........
0030 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 44 95 ..............D.
0040 69 f8 98 69 2a cf 87 6c 41 eb bf 95 14 0c 7e b8 i..i*..lA.....~.
0050 af 0c d4 17 ad d0 2e 76 b8 75 cf 29 a4 8f 4c f7 .......v.u.)..L.
0060 75 fe 22 86 a4 96 a6 14 0d 03 3c 2a 0d c5 95 9d u.".......<*....
0070 ca cc 56 1d 39 f0 21 ab 1d a9 76 0c 32 ec 71 3a ..V.9.!...v.2.q:
0080 11 66 17 46 0a dc 5d ce 74 41 f8 bf e7 ee a1 1e .f.F..].tA......
0090 c2 b9 88 07 6a 18 f2 88 3c 3d 5d 29 a4 b9 49 ac ....j...<=])..I.
00a0 bd c3 91 ec 82 da 2b d9 eb 4d b7 8e 54 44 ef 04 ......+..M..TD..
00b0 d4 91 4d 30 d7 91 c8 36 0f 92 d1 47 4b 50 e5 1f ..M0...6...GKP..
00c0 8e 68 c6 90 1d 9c a0 46 bb b0 2f 64 17 ed 60 ca .h.....F../d..‘.
00d0 d9 81 89 b7 30 08 9d 80 c6 f6 cd 4e 7c 0f 82 67 ....0......N|..g
00e0 15 04 fe e6 d9 8f 7b 20 a6 12 be 2c 90 0e b5 2a ......{ ...,...*
00f0 8d 16 56 60 d0 85 f8 60 1f 3d 54 25 d4 71 3b 95 ..V‘...‘.=T%.q;.
0100 8e 24 82 68 b4 64 0d be 00 35 92 67 6e 4d 46 e0 .$.h.d...5.gnMF.
0110 40 85 f2 a7 89 76 23 75 d4 72 7a 7e 94 4e 09 3e @....v#u.rz~.N.>
0120 5f 29 43 c7 ce ec 45 a1 f6 1a 76 7c 79 af 87 dc _)C...E...v|y...
0130 d1 63 26 fd 28 48 b3 63 ca 43 5f 82 94 00 .c&.(H.c.C_...
Fig. 3. ICMP-Chat echo reply
Major differences with this reply packet are centered on overall packet size
of 318 bytes with a data size of 276 bytes. The dramatic increase in data size
contributes to an abnormal attribute for typical ICMP traffic. This large packet
size decreases the covertness of this solution. If the network restricts large ICMP
packets, ICMP-Chat will likely be blocked.
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Firewall Resiliency. Session initiation of ICMP-Chat with the Checkpoint
firewall must follow request and reply structure. By default, ICMP-Chat uses
echo reply packets. Similar to stateful firewall inspection, the Checkpoint firewall
expects an echo request then permits an echo reply. If both internal and external
nodes use the echo replies, the firewall does not permit the communication. If the
communication is changed to an echo request and reply structure the Checkpoint
firewall permits the communication. This similar structure must be followed for
continued communication; an echo request must be received before an echo reply
is permitted to traverse the firewall.
IDS Resiliency. The Snort IDS was unable to detect abnormal ICMP traffic
when conducting the covert channel. This further confirms that abnormal ICMP
packet sizes are not added to the normal IDS ruleset. Given that the data field
is encrypted, this adds to the level of complexity needed for IDS detection in
covert channels.
6.2 Ping Tunnel
Ping Tunnel [4] serves as a covert tunneling tool to disguise TCP traffic in ICMP
request and reply packets. The basis of this technique is to disguise traffic as a
wrapper protocol and bypass specific TCP filtering. This is achieved through
the use of an external proxy to convert transmitted ICMP client packets back to
standard TCP packets. Unlike ICMP-Chat, Ping Tunnel strictly uses ICMP echo
request and reply packets for communication. Connections are very similar to
TCP in that lost packets are resent as necessary to allow for reliability. Multiple
connections are permitted through the use of the ICMP identifier field. The
identifier field is included within the standard Ping Tunnel packet format and
should not be confused with the ICMP sequence number field.
The example test environment, illustrated in Figure 4, was designed to al-
low the client node to establish an SSH tunnel to an Internet based server. A
known proxy address was provided to the client and listens on a local port which
tunnels all traffic via ICMP echo request/reply packets. Once the ICMP proxy
was established, an SSH connection was initiated from the client to the localhost
port.
Upon establishment of the connection, the standard SSH handshake can be
viewed in captured ICMP echo request/reply packets.
The packet capture in Figure 5 shows a standard OpenSSH version handshake
embedded in the data field of a ICMP echo reply.
Firewall Resiliency. The Checkpoint firewall permitted Ping Tunnel traffic
largely due to the adherence to the ICMP echo request and reply structure. If
this request and reply format is continued throughout the communication, the
traffic will go largely unnoticed. Unsolicited connections will be dropped by the
firewall. Similar to ICMP-Chat, the Checkpoint firewall did not specifically block
large ICMP packets.
IDS Resiliency. The inline Snort IDS also failed to detect this covert chan-
nel. Again, abnormally sized ICMP messages are overlooked given this situation.
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Fig. 4. Ping Tunnel covert channel environment
No. Time Source Destination
Protocol Info
10 0.012010 192.168.234.131 192.168.234.132
ICMP Echo (ping) reply
Frame 10 (92 bytes on wire, 92 bytes captured)
Ethernet II, Src: Vmware_3a:02:dd (00:50:56:3a:02:dd), Dst:
Vmware_3a:02:db (00:50:56:3a:02:db)
Internet Protocol, Src: 192.168.234.131 (192.168.234.131), Dst:
192.168.234.132 (192.168.234.132)
Internet Control Message Protocol




Sequence number: 0 (0x0000)
Data (50 bytes)
0000 d5 20 08 80 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 80 00 00 02 .
..............
0010 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 15 00 00 e5 10 53 53 48 2d
............SSH-
0020 32 2e 30 2d 4f 70 65 6e 53 53 48 5f 35 2e 31 0d
2.0-OpenSSH_5.1.
0030 0a 20 .
Data: D52008800000000000000000800000020000000000000015...
Fig. 5. Ping Tunnel OpenSSH handshake
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It is possible to tailor a custom ruleset to detect this activity, but the default
ruleset fails to recognize frequent, abnormally large ICMP messages.
7 Conclusion
Based on the experimental findings of this study it is very clear that a simple
ICMP based covert channel can easily subvert many modern security appliances
if general ICMP traffic is permitted. Administrators and security researchers
should be aware of the capabilities of a seemingly helpful protocol. Current tools
are widely and freely available for use across a number of platforms.
Blocking all ICMP traffic may not be an acceptable business practice in may
cases. Steps can be taken to further reduce the risk of an ICMP covert channel.
Limiting the overall packet size of ICMP messages may disrupt communications.
Ensuring unsolicited ICMP messages are dropped at the perimeter can assist in
preventing channel establishment, but as investigated, this can be easily circum-
vented by following a request and reply structure.
An IDS can be further improved by monitoring ICMP traffic flow. Ping Tun-
nel generated abnormally sized ICMP packets and often produced constant or
bursting traffic to the proxy node. IDS technology can be implemented to flag
this abnormal traffic for further investigation. The traffic analysis can be com-
pared to constant streams of ICMP traffic resulting in varying packet sizes to a
single destination.
Even with many security mechanisms and precautions in place, covert chan-
nel may still exist. This activity is essentially what a covert channel fundamen-
tally strives to be, an undetectable channel of communication.
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